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I.  INTRODUCTION: BRUTUS, CONSTITUTIONAL ROT AND CYCLICAL 
CALLS FOR COURT REFORM 
Once upon a time, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the phrase “judicial independence” struck fear into the hearts of many 
Americans, especially those associated with the Anti-Federalist movement.  
Robert Yates, for example, writing under the pseudonym “Brutus,” wrote with 
horror of the proposed independence of the judiciary: 
[The Constitution has] made the judges independent, in the fullest 
sense of the word.  There is no power above them, to controul any of 
their decisions.  There is no authority that can remove them, and they 
cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature.  In short, they are 
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under 
heaven.  Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel 
themselves independent of heaven itself.1 
Brutus was not alone in sounding the alarm about the dangers of a truly 
independent judiciary.2  Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Spencer Roane in 
1819, referred to the Constitution as “a mere thing of wax in the hands of the 
judiciary” and warned that “it should be remembered as an axiom of eternal 
truth in politics that whatever power in any government is independent, is 
absolute also.”3    
Alexander Hamilton, as persuader-in-chief of the constitutional 
ratification period, provided a rebuttal to these alarmist critiques of the 
proposed design for the federal judiciary.  In an essay we now refer to as 
Federalist No. 78,4  Hamilton vigorously defended the importance of judicial 
independence for the rule of law and for the integrity of our written 
Constitution.  Hamilton emphasized that the judicial branch, precisely because 
of its structural independence, was the only branch positioned to serve as the 
guardian of the Constitution5.  Constitutional rights and protections, Hamilton 
reasoned, would be safe – or at least safest given the alternatives – with a 
judiciary removed from public pressures.6  
But there are caveats – significant ones – in Hamilton’s essay; caveats 
that many seem to have forgotten about.  The judiciary had to exercise its 
 
1. Letters of Brutus, XV, N.Y. J., March 20, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 186–89 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis added).  
2. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 
S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 321 (1999). 
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0734 
[https://perma.cc/X5BT-5RLG].. 
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 432–40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
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power in a particular way, separated from and distinct from politics and from 
the political branches.  If the courts were ever to become simply another arm 
of partisan politics, Hamilton warned, the consequences for liberty and for the 
rule of law would be frightful to contemplate.7  If these Hamiltonian caveats 
were to be realized, judicial independence would not only be threatened, it 
would become threatening.  That is, under certain conditions, judicial 
independence – as Brutus, Jefferson, and the Anti-Federalists feared – would, 
in fact, become dangerous for and destructive to the American constitutional 
system. 
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Jack Balkin argues that we are 
currently witnessing the very conditions that make judicial independence 
potentially dangerous and destructive for our system.8  Collectively, Balkin 
refers to these conditions as “constitutional rot.”9  Constitutional rot is a period 
marked by the visible and identifiable “backsliding in democratic and 
republican norms and institutions” that is usually indicative of the impending 
death of one constitutional regime and the birth of another.10   In the Parts that 
follow, using Balkin’s excellent analysis as a jumping off point, I give a bit 
more texture to some of these drivers of our current period of constitutional 
rot.  Specifically, I examine polarization, partisanship, court capture, and the 
trend of increasing judicial supremacy and the finality of Supreme Court 
rulings as ingredients of constitutional rot.  
These dynamics help explain and contextualize the sudden resurgence 
of calls for court reform on the left, which I am calling the “exhumation of 
Brutus.” This is especially true in the wake of the jarring and sudden death of 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the fevered battle to fill her seat just days 
before the 2020 presidential election.11  
 
 
7. Id. at 434. 
8. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME, 44–45 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2020). 
9. Id. at 45. 
10. Id.  
11. Mark Z. Barabak & Janet Hook, McConnel vows to fill Ginsburg’s seat 
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II.  RECIPE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ROT: A PARTISAN COURT, A 
CAPTURED COURT, AND A MORE SUPREME COURT12 
In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed something rather unique 
about the fledgling American democracy; namely, that “Scarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a 
judicial question.”13  Almost two centuries later, this observation rings truer 
than ever.  With polarization and gridlock in Congress, individuals and 
organized interest groups are increasingly looking to the judicial branch to 
carry out their policy agendas.  The Supreme Court, itself intensely divided 
along partisan lines, has demonstrated a willingness to play a more active, 
hands-on role in politics.  In the last decade, for example, the high court has 
issued divided and divisive rulings on voting rights,14 campaign finance,15 gun 
rights,16 contraception,17 marriage equality,18 healthcare,19 immigration,20 
abortion,21 and LGBTQ discrimination,22 just to name a few.   
As political scientists since Alexis de Tocqueville have observed, certain 
underlying features of our political system and culture invite lawyers and 
judges to play a significant role in policymaking in the United States.  These 
features include a mismatch between our inherited political institutions, our 
political culture, and a politically selected, independent federal judiciary with 
the power of judicial review.  
That our political institutions reflect a profound distrust and skepticism 
of concentrated power has been an implicit feature of our political culture.  As 
James Madison famously wrote in Federalist No. 51: “In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty 
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and 
 
12. Parts of this section originally appeared in Amanda Hollis-Brusky, An 
Activist’s Court: Political Polarization and the Roberts Court, in PARCHMENT 
BARRIERS: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
(2018).   
13. ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
1945).  
14. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
15. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also McCutcheon v. 
FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
16. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), see also McDonald 
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
17. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S.682 (2014). 
18. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
19. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also 
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2015). 
20. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California. 140 S. 
Ct. 1891 (2020). 
21. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
22. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).  
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in the next place oblige it to control itself.”23  Dividing and fragmenting power 
through federalism and the separation of powers, our Madisonian system of 
government was designed to reign in and prevent an overly active or energetic 
government.24  On the other hand, in tension with these inherited political and 
constitutional structures, we have a political culture that increasingly seeks 
out and demands “total justice”25 – that is, a set of attitudes that “expects and 
demands comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm, 
injustice and environmental dangers.”26  In short, Americans increasingly 
want the government to protect them from harm – to ensure their airplanes 
and vehicles are safe, their food and water are not poisoned, and their toys are 
not harmful to children27 – but the fragmented political institutions we have 
inherited on top of our lingering skepticism of “Big Government” make 
courts, not legislatures or bureaucracies, a much more appealing option for 
satisfying these demands.   
Thomas Burke, building on the work of Robert A. Kagan, explains how 
and why this mismatch between our political structures and our political 
culture invites and encourages policymaking through litigation and courts:  
First, courts offer activists a way to address social problems without 
seeming to augment the power of the state. . . Second, [policymaking 
through litigation] offer[s] a means of overcoming the barriers to 
activist government posed by the structures of the Constitution. . . 
activists [can] surmount the fragmented, decentralized structure of 
American government, which, (as its creators intended and James 
Madison famously boasted) makes activist government difficult.28  
An independent and politically selected judiciary makes litigation even 
more attractive to policy entrepreneurs; especially to those on the losing end 
of the political process.  Political losers and political minorities turn to the 
independent judiciary (that is, unelected and unaccountable) in the hopes of 
persuading judges of claims that fail to command a majority in the legislature. 
Because federal courts have the power of judicial review, interest groups 
and policy entrepreneurs routinely ask them to strike down federal and state 
 
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999). 
24. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 15 (2nd ed., Harvard Univ. 
Press 2019); see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 7 
(2004). 
25. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994). 
26. KAGAN, supra note 24, at 15. 
27. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 6–7 (2nd prtg. 2004). 
28. BURKE, supra note 24, at 7. 
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statutes, or to overturn the rulings of administrative agencies.  Additionally, 
the decentralized structure of the American judiciary actively encourages 
forum shopping; that is, well-resourced policy entrepreneurs testing their 
claims in multiple courts in the hopes of finding a sympathetic judge who is 
willing to creatively interpret existing statutory or constitutional language to 
advance their policy agenda (or to thwart the policy agenda of their political 
opponents).29  
The underlying structural and cultural features that have long invited 
judges and lawyers to play a role in American politics have been amplified 
over the past twenty years by political polarization in Congress, the rise of 
divided government, and alternating and uncertain party control of 
government.  These developments in our legislative politics have further 
incentivized groups or movements seeking policy change to opt for a strategy 
of litigation over legislation, turning the Supreme Court into what I have 
elsewhere referred to as “an Activist’s Court.”30  
A.  Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: Political Polarization + A 
Partisan Court31 
One of the primary features of constitutional rot, according to Balkin, is 
polarization: “[R]ot encourages polarization and it is exacerbated by 
polarization.”32  Since 1980 – incidentally, the beginning of our current 
constitutional regime according to Jack Balkin – the ideological distance 
between the Democrat and Republican elites has grown at a remarkable rate.33  
Prior to Ronald Reagan’s rise to power, there was “no meaningful gap in the 
median liberal-conservative scores of the two parties,” with both Democrats 
and Republicans in Congress occupying “every ideological niche.”34  Fast 
forward four decades and there is currently no ideological overlap between 
the two parties in Congress.  The most liberal Republican is still to the right 
of the most conservative Democrat, and vice-versa.  Political scientists refer 
to this phenomenon as “political polarization.”  Because “the Supreme Court 
follows the election returns,”35 our polarized politics have produced a 
polarized, ideologically divided judiciary.  
As regime politics theory details, because we have a politically selected 
judiciary, over time the courts will tend to reflect the values of the electoral 
 
29. KAGAN, supra note 24, at 16. 
30. Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.   
31. Parts of this section originally appear in Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.   
32. Balkin, supra note 8,  at 151. 
33. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization 
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. Rev. 301, 321 (2016). 
34. Id. at 29. 
35. Forrest Maltzman, Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Supreme Court 
Justices Really Do Follow the Election Returns, 37 PS: POL. SCI. & POLITICS 839, 839 
(2004). 
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coalition that dominates.36  As Cornell Clayton and Michael Salamone write, 
“During the past 40 years, American politics has been dominated by a partisan 
regime that is at once more conservative than the New Deal regime it replaced, 
but also more closely divided and polarized than any in more than a 
century.”37  Control of the White House and control of the Senate has 
vacillated between Republicans and Democrats since the early-1990s when 
the most senior Associate Justice was appointed to the Supreme Court.38  This 
pattern of alternating party dominance in national electoral politics, coupled 
with the rise of strategic retirements by judges and Justices since President 
Clinton (that is, retiring under an ideologically compatible or same-party 
president),39 has left us with a correspondingly divided and polarized Supreme 
Court.   
The rise of divided government and alternating party control has also 
resulted in increasing gridlock and obstructionism in the federal government, 
which has further encouraged policy entrepreneurs to use the courts rather 
than legislatures to advance their own policy agendas.  Though pursuing a 
legal strategy to advance a policy agenda can be risky due to the unpredictable 
nature of judicial rulings40 and the various constraints that inhibit courts from 
easily enforcing broad and sweeping changes in policy,41 groups are more 
attracted to litigation as a strategy under two primary conditions: when 
significant political and institutional barriers make litigation the only realistic 
option42 and when policy entrepreneurs want to insulate their policy gains43 
 
36. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making and Democracy: The Supreme 
Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 298–99 (1957); Howard Gillman, 
Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND POLITICS 644, 645 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008).  
37. Cornell W. Clayton & Michael S. Salamone, Still Crazy After All These 
Years: The Polarized Politics of the Roberts Court Continue, 12 THE FORUM 739, 740 
(2014). 
38. Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/V7DS-
B497] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
39. Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the 
US Supreme Court, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER AND IMPACT 
OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 171, 179 (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
40. See generally KAGAN, supra note 24. 
41. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (John Tryneski 
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2008). 
42. See Silverstein, Law’s Allure. See also, Burke, Lawyers Lawsuits and 
Litigation. 
43. See generally, Thomas F Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits and Legal Rights. 
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from shifting and uncertain electoral fortunes.44  Both conditions currently 
exist.  
Divided government, which occurs when one political party controls the 
presidency while the opposition controls at least one branch of Congress (and 
which has been the norm in American politics since 1989),45 erects barriers to 
policymaking through legislative channels.  This is because divided 
government, particularly when coupled with ideologically distant parties, 
increases the number of potential veto points in the policymaking process, 
often requiring supermajorities to pass legislation.  As Thomas Keck writes, 
“[O]n both the left and the right, legislative losers turn to the courts as a matter 
of course.”46  More veto points and more gridlock makes virtually every group 
a “legislative loser” and makes the courts a more attractive venue.47  Instead 
of having to win the votes of majorities or super-majorities in the legislature, 
at the Supreme Court, one only needs to secure five votes.48  
Pursuing policy through the courts also allows policy entrepreneurs to 
“insulate” their victories from political enemies.49  This is a particularly 
attractive option when partisan control of the legislature and the executive is 
in near-constant flux and turnover, as it has been since the 1980s.50  In the 
period from 1980-2015, for example, control of the presidency alternated 
between Democrats and Republicans four times, the Senate changed hands 
seven times, and the House of Representatives three times.51  And, as I 
detailed earlier, for the majority of this period, no single party had control of 
both houses of Congress and the presidency.52  This makes policy gains 
 
44. See, e.g., FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press 
2016). 
45. Tyler Hughes & Deven Carlson, How Party Polarization Makes the 
Legislative Process Even Slower When Government is Divided, UNITED STATES 
POLITICS & POLICY BLOG, (May 19, 2015), http://bit.ly/1EhrEsO 
[https://perma.cc/J8UH-6XY7]. 
46. THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 20 (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2014). 
47. See BALKIN, supra note 8, at 139–40. 
48. It is illustrative here to cite the late Associate Justice William Brennan’s 
famous Rule of Five: “Brennan liked to greet his new clerks each fall by asking them 
what they thought was the most important thing they needed to know as they began 
their work in his chambers. The pair of stumped novices would watch quizzically as 
Brennan held up five fingers. Brennan then explained that with five votes, you could 
accomplish anything” Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2013). 
49. BURKE, supra note 24, at 14–15. 
50. See Party Government Since 1857, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE 




52. Id. Between 1980 and 2015, the government was unified just seven of the 
total eighteen sessions of Congress during that period. Id. 
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through the federal legislature a risky and uncertain bet.  Even if one party 
does manage to secure unified government for a short period, as the 
Democrats did between 2009 and 2011,53 any policies passed – even major 
legislation like the Affordable Care Act – must be considered to be unstable 
and uncertain.54  When the Republicans took back the House and the Senate 
in the ensuing years, they voted more than fifty times to repeal or roll-back 
parts of the Act.55  These efforts failed only because the Democrats maintained 
control of the presidency.  Because courts are relatively independent from the 
rest of the political system, they can provide a “seemingly safer route” for 
policymaking and implementation than the political branches.56  Moreover, 
because judges serve longer terms and create legal precedent with their 
rulings, judicial decisions tend to be stickier or more “path-dependent” than 
those in the political branches.57 
Not only is the Supreme Court more polarized than ever before, as 
Balkin notes,58 it is also more identifiably partisan than any time in the last 
100 years.  Since 2010, for example, the Supreme Court has been strictly 
divided along partisan lines, with every Justice appointed by a Democratic 
president voting more liberally than every Justice appointed by a Republican 
president.59  Far from being the historical norm, this partisan divide is out of 
step with traditional patterns of voting and alignment on the Court.60  For 
example, the Roberts Court has split or “sharply divided” (five-to-four, four-
to-four, four-to-three, or three-to-two) on nearly one of every five decisions it 
has rendered, which is the highest rate of division of any court since the New 
Deal.61  This partisan split on the Court has produced divided and divisive 
 
53. Id. 
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122 
(2010). 
55. Byron York, No, House Republicans Haven’t Voted 50 Times to Repeal 
Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/no-house-republicans-havent-voted-50-times-
to-repeal-obamacare [https://perma.cc/J3R7-JWTS].   
56. BURKE, supra note 24, at 15. 
57. See Silverstein, supra note 42, at 1086–91; AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS 
WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION 149–51 (Steven Teles ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
58. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 118–21. 
59. Devins & Baum, supra note 33. 
60. Id. at 310. 
61. Clayton & Salamone, supra note 37, at 745. 
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five-to-four rulings on major issues such as gun control,62 health care,63 voting 
rights,64 campaign finance,65 and fair housing.66  As Brandon Bartels notes, a 
“vicious circle” exists between polarization on the Supreme Court and the 
nomination process, with each political party vying to either preserve (the 
Republicans) or dismantle (the Democrats) the first ideologically 
homogenous voting bloc on the Supreme Court since the Warren Court.67  
This identifiable pattern of partisan voting and behavior on the Supreme 
Court has invited politicians, scholars, and commentators to attack and 
attempt to delegitimize judicial rulings by noting that the judiciary is doing 
nothing more than enacting its preferred policy and voting on strictly partisan 
lines.68  This has consequences for how the public views the legitimacy of the 
federal judiciary.  Political science literature puts an exclamation point on this, 
demonstrating the damaging and corrosive effects these portrayals of the 
federal judiciary as “just another political institution” can have on the 
legitimacy of the courts.69  
Stephen Nicholson and Thomas Hansford write that the public’s 
perception of the Supreme Court as a “legal” versus a “political” institution is 
key to the public’s perception of its legitimacy.70  James L. Gibson and 
Michael Nelson confirmed this finding with recent survey research.71  These 
scholars concluded that the single greatest threat to the Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy comes from its perceived politicization; that is, the belief that 
“judges are little more than ‘politicians in robes.’”72  More recent research 
suggests how perceptions of a politicized judiciary can be exacerbated by 
high-profile and contentious judicial confirmation hearings.73  This 
scholarship provides contemporary empirical support for what Alexander 
 
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
64. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
65. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
66. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
67. BARTELS, supra note 39, at 172. 
68. See, e.g., James Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a 
Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 507 (2007). 
69. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory: 
What Roles do Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in 
Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 592, 592 
(2017).   
70. Stephen P. Nicholson & Thomas G. Hansford, Partisans in Robes: Party 
Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 620, 
620–636 (2014).  
71. Id. 
72. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 69, at 595.  
73. Christopher N. Krewson & Jean R. Schroedel, Public Views of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the Aftermath of the Kavanaugh Confirmation, 101 SOC. SCI. Q. 
1430, 1430 (2020).  
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Hamilton knew to be true even in the eighteenth century74: the judiciary’s 
power under our constitution – its very legitimacy – depends on the people 
seeing it as distinct from politics.  
B.  Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: A Captured Court75 
When courts become deeply involved in politics and policymaking, in 
addition to putting their institutional legitimacy on the line, they also run the 
risk of provoking some of the more pernicious features of our constitutional 
design.  Policymaking through courts – that is, when judges become “the 
vanguard of policy change”76 – can invite elite capture or minority tyranny 
and weaken the checks and balances built into the constitution.  Policymaking 
through courts invites a handful of elite, unelected lawyers and judges to craft 
and shape policy, which in turn facilitates the kind of minority capture our 
Constitution was designed to guard against.  
When policy entrepreneurs turn to courts instead of legislatures, they can 
effectively circumvent the various safeguards and constitutional veto points 
built into the legislative process (congressional committees, majority 
requirements, supermajority requirements, and the presidential veto).  These 
veto points are designed to decelerate the legislative process, to ensure broad 
coalitions for governing, and to prevent smaller, energetic “factions” from 
capturing and dominating the process.  As James Madison wrote in Federalist 
No. 10, among the “numerous advantages” of this model of government was 
its ability to “break and control the violence of faction” by “extending the 
sphere” and multiplying the number of competing voices and distinct interests 
involved in the process.77  These multiple veto points “foster more pluralistic 
legislative inputs and outputs” and prevent legislatures from acting swiftly 
and energetically.78  
Policymaking by lawyers and judges circumvents these checks, leaving 
policy in the hands of the few, unelected elite, which, if we follow Madison’s 
analysis in Federalist No. 10, facilitates tyranny of the minority, or elite 
capture:  
 
74. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
75. Parts of this section first appeared in my written testimony before the House 
Judiciary Committee. See Testimony Before the Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intell. Prop. and the Internet, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Amanda 
Hollis-Brusky, Assoc. Professor, Pomona Coll.). 
76. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 139. 
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
78. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on 
Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 
643 (2014). 
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The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties 
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, 
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the 
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the 
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will 
they concert and execute their plans of oppression.79 
When it comes to judicial policymaking, the number of individuals with 
access to power and the “compass” within which they are placed are both 
incredibly small.  
To make policy through the Supreme Court, for example, policy 
entrepreneurs simply need to secure five votes.80  And, while historically the 
Justices of the Supreme Court have come from diverse backgrounds, 
education, and careers, we currently have a Supreme Court that is composed 
entirely of elite, educated lawyers (eight of whom attended Ivy League law 
schools) with no political or legislative experience.81  As Mark Graber writes, 
Supreme Court “[j]ustices tend to act on elite values because Justices are 
almost always selected from the most affluent and highly educated stratum of 
Americans.”82  In other words, Madison’s recipe for elite capture in Federalist 
No. 10 (a small number of people with uniform interests and backgrounds 
who can readily and easily concert to execute their plans) reads like a template 
for our current Supreme Court.83   
Moreover, because judicial policymaking requires lawyers to argue and 
bring cases to the courts (judges and Justices cannot simply make cases and 
questions appear before them “as if by magic”),84 the policymaking process is 
de facto captured and controlled by this unelected, elite group.  This capture 
by lawyers has become even more pronounced over the past two decades, with 
the rise of the Federalist Society on the right and the American Constitution 
Society on the left.  As I write in Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist 
Society and the Conservative Counterrevolution, these two groups of lawyers 
are actively working to shape both the “supply side” of judicial policymaking 
(bringing cases, organizing litigation campaigns, providing intellectual 
 
79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 77, at 78. 
80. Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United 
States Supreme Court, 1900-90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667 (1993). 
81. Michelle McGough, How to diversify the Ivy League club that is the Supreme 
Court, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-court-diversity-ivy-
league-20141028-story.html.  
82. Mark Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion, 
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L. J., 661, 664 
(2013). 
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
84. See CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 5 (1998). See also HOLLIS-
BRUSKY, supra note 57.  
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support for judicial decisions) as well as the “demand side” (working to get 
particular kinds of judges and Justices nominated and confirmed).85  
For reasons I explore in more depth in Ideas, only one of these groups 
has managed to actually achieve a “de-facto monopoly” on the “training, 
promotion and disciplining of lawyers and judges”86: the Federalist Society 
for Law and Public Policy Studies.  It is worthwhile for that reason to spend 
some time examining how they achieved this “monopoly” as this could be 
perceived by the public as capture or at the very least politicization of the 
courts.87  
Launched in 1982 by a small group of conservative and libertarian law 
students at Yale Law School and the University of Chicago Law School, the 
Federalist Society was founded to provide an alternative to the perceived 
liberal orthodoxy that dominated the law school curriculum, the professoriate, 
and most legal institutions at the time.88  Almost 40 years later, the Federalist 
Society has moved beyond law schools and grown into a vast network of 
upwards of 70,000 conservative and libertarian lawyers, policymakers, 
legislators, judges, journalists, academics, and law students.89  The project of 
the Federalist Society was and is to create a conservative counter-elite – that 
is, a group of interconnected legal professionals dedicated to conservative 
judicial and policy positions – and to actively work to get these people into 
positions of power where they can push the law and public policy in a 
conservative direction.90  Federalist Society co-founder Steven Calabresi 
described this project in our interview together: 
I think my own goal for the Federalist Society has been . . . [to] have 
an organization that will create a network of alumni who have been 
shaped in a particular way. . . . [B]ecause many of our members are 
right of center and because they tend to be interested in public policy 
and politics, a lot of them go on to do jobs in government and take 
positions in government where they become directly involved in 
policymaking.  So I think it’s fair to say that Federalist Society alumni 
 
85. See HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 165–75. 
86. Id. at 152–55.. 
87. This section borrows heavily from my previously published work. See 
HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57.  
88. See HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57. 
89. About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, https://fedsoc.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/SKE5-4ZED]. 
90. David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Court, THE WASHINGTON POST 
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who go into government have tended to push public policy in a 
libertarian–conservative direction.91 
As I detail in Ideas with Consequences, the Federalist Society has been 
incredibly successful in its project to “push public policy” and judicial 
decision-making in a conservative-libertarian direction.92  I briefly outline 
below three ways the Federalist Society – now with a six-Justice super-
majority on the Supreme Court – continues to exert its influence on the federal 
courts.  
1.  Judicial Selection93 
As several Federalist Society members said to me in our interviews 
together, “policy is people.”  There is a recognition that in order for ideas to 
have consequences, you need to get people who share those ideas and provide 
them with access to the levers of power.  When it comes to the federal courts, 
this is done first by populating White House counsel and those responsible for 
judicial selection under Republican administrations with Federalist Society 
network members.  Don McGahn, former White House Counsel under 
President Trump and stalwart Federalist Society member, has openly and 
repeatedly referred to this as “in-sourcing” judicial selection to the Federalist 
Society.94  Those network members working within the administration then 
identify, vet, and select judges with identifiable and reliable ties to the 
Federalist Society network.  In this way, as Federalist Society member 
Michael Greve put it in our 2008 interview, the Federalist Society has “a de 
facto monopoly” on the process.  Highlighting the contrast between the 
Federalist Society on the right and attempts to replicate its influence on the 
left, Greve emphasized, “on the left there a million ways of getting 
credentialed, on the political right, there’s only one way in these legal 
circles.”95  
 
91. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 10. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 153–55. 
94. Robert Barnes, Federalist Society, White House Cooperation on Judges 
Paying Benefits, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Nov. 18, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/federalist-society-white-house-
cooperation-on-judges-paying-benefits/2017/11/18/4b69b4da-cb20-11e7-8321-
481fd63f174d_story.html. It is worth noting that at a March 2020 conference on the 
future of judicial nominations at Princeton University that I attended, McGahn’s 
keynote doubled down on the synchronous relationship between the Republican Party 
and the Federalist Society, noting that he only hired Federalist Society members in his 
office and his office only considered Federalist Society judges because this credential 
signaled loyalty to the team. 
95. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 152. 
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2.  Lobbying the Courts96 
Once Federalist Society judges are appointed to the federal bench, they 
can then be lobbied or helped by fellow network members who support them 
in pushing the law in a conservative-libertarian direction.  Primarily, this 
involves Federalist Society members providing judges and their clerks with 
what I call “intellectual capital” to help them justify radically altering or 
reshaping longstanding constitutional frameworks.  Because judges and 
Justices do not simply “vote” like legislators, but instead publish judicial 
opinions that outline their reasoning and provide justifications for their 
decisions, courts are uniquely susceptible to this kind of intellectual influence 
and lobbying.  As I show in Ideas, in some of the most controversial decisions 
of the conservative counterrevolution currently underway on the Supreme 
Court, the Federalist Society network played a key role in providing the 
intellectual support and scaffolding for these judicial opinions.97  
3.  Acting as a Vocal and Vigilant “Judicial Audience”98 
To have a serious and lasting influence on the direction of constitutional 
law and jurisprudence – a constitutional revolution – you need to appoint the 
right kinds of judges and Justices to the federal judiciary and then you need to 
make sure that, once appointed, they do not fall victim to “judicial drift” – that 
is, the observed tendency for some conservative Supreme Court appointees to 
moderate their beliefs during their tenure on the court.  It has been well-
documented that the Federalist Society influences the first half of this equation 
under Republican administrations  – who gets appointed – but, as I show in 
Ideas, it also influences the second half of the equation by exerting social and 
psychological pressure to keep these judges faithful to their Federalist Society 
principles once on the bench.99   
This function is best understood in light of political scientist Lawrence 
Baum’s concept of a “judicial audience.”100  In his book, Judges and Their 
Audiences,101 Baum draws on research in social psychology to argue that 
judges, like all other people, seek approval or applause from certain social and 
professional groups, and that the manner in which a judge decides cases and 
writes opinions may be influenced by certain “audiences” the judge knows 
 
96. Id. at 148–52.  
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 155–59. 
99. Id. 
100. See BALKIN, supra note 8, at 118–21.  
101. Lawrence Baum, JUDGES AND THE THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 24–49 (2006). 
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will be paying attention to his or her “performance.”102  Moreover, Baum 
shows that of all the types of audiences for whom a judge might perform, 
“social groups and the legal community have the greatest impact on the 
choices of most judges.”103  The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, 
as a social and professional network extending to all levels of the legal 
community, can be understood as a hybrid of both of these most influential 
referent groups for judges.  I provide anecdotes from my interviews with 
Federalist Society members who describe approaching judges and Justices at 
Federalist Society conferences and dinners and meetings and telling them 
“face to face” that these judges and Justices erred.  In fact, these members 
valued the opportunity, through the Federalist Society, to provide “direct 
feedback” to these judges.104  
4. The Trump Administration: “In-Sourcing” Federalist Society 
Influence 
Whereas the pages of Ideas chronicle the subtle, behind-the-scenes 
manner in which Federalist Society members worked in the Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush administrations to influence judicial 
selection and decisionmaking, the Trump administration has taken Federalist 
Society access and influence to a new zenith.105  Even before Trump was 
sworn into office, his campaign took the unprecedented step of releasing a list 
of twenty-one potential Supreme Court nominees – a list curated by multiple 
Federalist Society network members, including Vice President of the 
Federalist Society Leonard Leo – two months prior to the election with the 
aim of wooing partisan Republicans who might otherwise be loath to vote for 
Trump.106  
President Trump made good on his promise to appoint judges “in the 
mold of Justice Scalia,” repaying partisan Republicans and the Federalist 
Society network for their loyalty.107  With Federalist Society Vice President 
Leonard Leo at his side, advising him and helping to shepherd his nominees 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 118. 
104. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 155. 
105. Id. 
106. Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court, THE NEW 
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-
conservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FLT5-N3MP]; John 
Malcolm, How Trump Changed the Courts in 2017, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 27, 
2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/how-trump-changed-the-courts-
2017 [https://perma.cc/GG4N-FTTG].  
107. Jonathan Adler, How Scalia-esque will Donald Trump’s Supreme Court 
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through confirmation, it is no overstatement to say that Trump has changed 
the face and the ideological balance of the federal judiciary, appointing young, 
conservative Federalist Society-type judges for lifetime terms.108  As his 
administration comes to a close, Trump can claim over 200 Article III 
appointees to the federal judiciary.109  
Perhaps most consequentially, Trump has helped the Federalist Society 
secure a six-Justice super-majority on the Supreme Court for the first time in 
history.110  Newly minted Justice Amy Coney Barrett has joined Federalist 
Society brethren John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil 
Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh,111 securing a super-majority voting bloc on 
 
108. Tessa Berenson, Inside Trump’s Plan to Dramatically Reshape U.S. 
Courts, TIME MAGAZINE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://time.com/5139118/inside-trumps-
plan-to-dramatically-reshape-us-courts/ [https://perma.cc/KW8Q-XBTM].  
109. John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in 




110. Michael Avery & Danielle McLaughlin, Barrett Poised to Be Sixth 
SCOTUS Justice Hand-Picked by Federalist Society, TRUTHOUT, (Oct. 24, 2020), 
https://truthout.org/articles/barrett-poised-to-be-sixth-scotus-justice-hand-picked-by-
federalist-society/ [https://perma.cc/UNW5-CHTB] . Just weeks into his term as 
president, Trump selected long-time Federalist Society member and conservative 
judge Neil Gorsuch to fill Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court. In another Federalist 
Society-friendly twist of fate, in June of 2018, Reagan appointee Anthony Kennedy 
announced his retirement from the Supreme Court. In addition to being the Supreme 
Court’s last remaining centrist or swing vote, Kennedy was the last remaining 
Republican-appointed justice on the Supreme Court with no ties to the Federalist 
Society. Kennedy was replaced with Brett Kavanaugh who, as was well-documented 
during his extremely controversial confirmation hearings, has long-standing and deep 
ties to the Federalist Society network. See generally Josh Gerstein, Gorsuch takes 
victory lap at Federalist dinner, POLITICO (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/16/neil-gorsuch-federalist-society-speech-
scotus-246538 [https://perma.cc/3L37-T6QF]. Toobin, supra note 106. 
111.  Michael Kruse, The Weekend at Yale Politics that Changed American 
Politics, POLITICO MAGIZINE (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/27/federalist-society-yale-history-
conservative-law-court-219608 [https://perma.cc/5JVR-FFYM]; Annie Grayer, Brett 
Kavanaugh was concerned with his Federalist Society membership in 2001, emails 
show, CNN, (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/brett-
kavanaugh-federalist-society-emails/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5DD-D2EJ].  
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the Supreme Court.112  As I tell my students every year when I do my judicial 
process lecture, the late Justice William Brennan was reported to have told 
every incoming class of law clerks that the “Rule of Five” is the most 
important rule to learn in Supreme Court jurisprudence.113  Why?  Because 
“with five votes, you could accomplish anything.”114  Just imagine what the 
Federalist Society will be able to do with six.  
If we trust the political science on this matter – and I do – then the 
Federalist Society’s increasingly open ties to the Republican Party, and 
specifically the Trump administration, is problematic from the standpoint of 
judicial independence and legitimacy and is contributing to what Balkin calls 
“constitutional rot.”  Recall that political scientists have shown empirically 
that when the public views the courts as “just another political institution,” 
their trust and belief in the legitimacy of the courts suffers.115  Whether the 
courts have, in fact, been captured by the Federalist Society is not what I am 
here to debate.  Just as the standard in campaign finance law is not just 
“corruption” but also “the appearance of corruption,” our conversation needs 
to focus not just on “capture” but also on “the appearance of capture.”  
The Federal Judicial Conference recognized this, too.  Advisory Opinion 
117 sought to amend the Judicial Code of Conduct to bar sitting federal judges 
from participating in conferences and seminars sponsored by groups 
“generally viewed by the public as having adopted a consistent political or 
ideological point of view equivalent to the type of partisanship often found in 
political organizations.”116  Though this advisory opinion was eventually 
withdrawn after intense opposition from Republican Senators and over 200 
Republican-appointed judges, its objectives were consistent with what the 
political science literature tells us. When judges participate in organizations 
that are “generally viewed by the public as having adopted a consistent 
political or ideological point of view,” judicial legitimacy suffers; distrust in 
the courts increases, and, as Balkin reminds us, constitutional rot deepens.117   
C.  Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: A More Supreme Court118 
 
112. Noah Feldman, Democrats Can’t Stop Brett Kavanaugh’s Confirmation, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-09-
04/kavanaugh-hearings-federalist-society-is-so-close-to-victory.  
113. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 
196 (2010). 
114. Id. 
115. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 69, at 592. 
116. Amanda Hollis-Brusky & Calvin TerBeek, The Federalist Society Says It’s 
Not an Advocacy Organization. These Documents Show Otherwise, POLITICO, Aug. 
13, 2019. 
117. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 151 (“Rot both produces and is caused by 
distrust in government institutions, especially the courts.”).  
118. Parts of this section originally appear in Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.   
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Perhaps equally as pernicious for our constitutional design and the rule 
of law, political polarization in Congress effectively weakens the checks and 
balances built into the constitution by empowering judges to have the final 
say in the interpretation and implementation of policy.  In short, it makes the 
Supreme Court even more supreme. 
When political scientists discuss the checks and balances between the 
courts and Congress, they often point out that the courts do not necessarily 
have the final say in matters of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 119  
“The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court relations,” Richard 
Hasen writes, “is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: 
Congress writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has 
the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations.”120  
If, for instance, the courts interpret a federal statute in a way Congress 
does not like or agree with, the latter can pass an override that revises or fixes 
the statute, which is what happened when the Supreme Court narrowly 
interpreted the statute of limitations for filing an equal pay lawsuit regarding 
pay discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121  Congress responded 
by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which clarified that the 
statute of limitations resets with every paycheck affected by discriminatory 
action.122  If the courts strike down part of a statute as unconstitutional, 
Congress can propose a constitutional amendment to address it, as it did with 
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which overrode the Supreme Court’s decision 
regarding lowering the voting age in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970).123  
Alternatively, Congress can rewrite the statute or part of the statute so that it 
aligns with the court’s understanding of the Constitution.   
But when political polarization results in gridlock and paralysis in 
Congress, its ability to “counteract” the “ambition” of the courts is severely 
compromised (to return to Madison’s Federalist No. 51).124  Two different 
scholars, using different methodologies, studied congressional overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions and reached the same conclusion: the number of 
congressional overrides of court decisions has dramatically declined since 
 
119. Lawrence Baum & Lori Hausegger, The Supreme Court and Congress: 
Reconsidering the Relationship, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH 
PERSPECTIVE 107 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004). 
120. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 208 
(2013). 
121. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
122. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. 
123. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112  (1970). 
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999). 
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1998.125  This means that, for all intents and purposes, the Court has the final 
say in matters of statutory and constitutional interpretation, which has real, 
practical consequences for the checks and balances between the branches.  As 
Hasen concludes, “In a highly polarized atmosphere and with Senate rules 
usually requiring sixty votes to change the status quo, the Court’s word on the 
meaning of statutes is now final almost as often as its word on constitutional 
interpretation.”126  
When, for example, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, struck 
down Section 4 (the coverage formula) of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby 
County v. Holder (2013),127 Chief Justice John Roberts suggested in his 
opinion that Congress could simply update the coverage formula and make 
the statute constitutional: “Congress may draft another formula based on 
current conditions . . . Our country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation 
it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”128  But, as all 
astute political observers at the time recognized, this invitation to Congress to 
simply “draft another formula” would not be taken up.  
In the dialogue that has traditionally characterized Court-Congress 
relations, Congress has effectively silenced itself through polarization and 
gridlock and has, as a consequence, shifted the balance of power to the courts. 
Practically speaking, this means that the Court has the final say in matters of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation, which has consequences for the 
checks and balances between the branches.  This can mean that five men – or 
five men and one woman – get the final say on the most significant political 
questions facing our country.   
III.  CONCLUSION: ROT, CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL & CALLS FOR 
COURT REFORM 
As this Article has illustrated, our polarized politics have led to 
ideologically-motivated and partisan appointments to the federal courts, 
invited minority capture of the policymaking process by a small group of 
unelected lawyers and judges, and aggravated some of the more pernicious 
features of our constitutional design and encouraged – even rewarded – more 
partisan decisionmaking by the judges and Justices on the federal bench.  
Political science warns us that the politicization of the federal courts has grave 
consequences for judicial independence.  The mere perception that courts are 
partisan and captured – whether or not we are convinced that this is an 
empirical reality – can cause “we the people” to call into question the very 
legitimacy of the federal courts and their rulings.  When we couple these 
 
125. See Hasen, supra note 120; Matthew R. Christiansen, Congressional 
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014). 
126. Hasen, supra note 120, at 209. 
127. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
128. Id. at 557. 
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problematic perceptions of the judiciary with the very real fact that the word 
of the courts is increasingly final and increasingly supreme on account of 
polarization and gridlock in Congress, then it is no overstatement to say we 
are at an inflection point in our constitutional democracy.  
It is worthwhile to recall Thomas Jefferson’s warnings in 1819 about the 
unique threat judicial supremacy poses for our entire constitutional system.129  
In his letter to Spencer Roane, Jefferson warned that making the judiciary – 
an unelected, unaccountable branch of government – too powerful would 
constitute, in his words, a “felo de se” (suicide) of our constitutional system:  
[F]or intending to establish three departments, coordinate and 
independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has 
given according to this opinion, to one of them alone the right to 
prescribe rules for the government of the others; and to that one too 
which is unelected by, and independent of, the nation.130   
Jefferson is reminding us of the dark side of judicial independence – the 
possibility of an unaccountable and unchecked rule by a few over the many.  
And, as Brutus warns, “Men,” and I will add women, “placed in this situation 
will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.”131 
This is why, as Jack Balkin astutely predicts in The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time,132 scholars, students, and now even elites and legislators 
in the Democratic Party are talking seriously about court reform and, in doing 
so, exhuming Brutus to illustrate the dark, dangerous, and even destructive 
side of judicial independence.  The fevered push by Senate Republicans and 
President Trump to fill Ginsburg’s seat over the late Justice’s own dying wish 
and the desire of millions of Americans to wait until after the presidential 
election is exactly the kind of episode of “constitutional hardball” that has and 
continues to characterize our period of constitutional rot.133  As Balkin notes, 
“Rot leads to ever more aggressive rounds of constitutional hardball; it causes 
 
129. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819) (available 
on Founders Online, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0734). 
130. Id.  
131. Letters of Brutus, XV, N.Y. J., March, 20, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 186 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  
132. Balkin, supra note 8, at 148–51. 
133. Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender 
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politicians to believe that they should risk reprisals to force a victory now 
before the other side has a chance to force a victory on them.”134  
This brazen and seemingly hypocritical political move by the 
Republicans in power – a move that has solidified a super-majority 
conservative voting bloc on the Supreme Court for the GOP into the 
foreseeable future – was, as it turns out, an inflection point for the left.  This 
dramatic episode has catapulted the issue of court reform onto the political 
agenda for Democrats.  While the hashtag #PackTheCourt was trending on 
Twitter during the nomination hearings of Amy Coney Barrett (and continues 
to be a rallying call for the left on social media sites), President Joe Biden has 
committed only to a bipartisan courts commission,135 to study the various 
options that would be available to his administration under unified 
government.  
Like President Biden, Jack Balkin urges the Democrats to proceed with 
caution and resist the allure of “packing the court” – that is, expanding the 
number of seats on the Supreme Court and lower courts so that Democrats can 
fill them with ideologically compatible judges and Justices.136  As Balkin 
warns, “Packing the Supreme Court by increasing its membership does 
nothing to promote public trust in the courts or the political branches.  It 
encourages constitutional hardball by the other side.  It is likely to increase 
polarization.”137  In short, Balkin, concludes, court packing “may make liberal 
Democrats feel better, but it will not address the deeper causes of rot in our 
constitutional system.”138  
Instead, Balkin recommends four kinds of reforms that would tend to 
“lower the stakes” of judicial appointments, thereby deescalating the arms 
race the parties have been engaged in over the Supreme Court for the last 
decade and a half in particular: (1) Instituting regular and predictable Supreme 
Court appointments; (2) creating a practical equivalent of term limits for 
Supreme Court Justices; (3) giving the Supreme Court less control over its 
own docket; and (4) using sunrise provisions that will encourage bipartisan 
reform.139 
The Balkin-Biden approach – which seeks to deescalate, disarm, take 
down the heat – seems to follow from the analysis and drivers of the cycles of 
polarization and depolarization in The Cycles of Constitutional Time.140  But 
it also seems illustrative of the Democrats’ tendency toward unilateral 
disarmament, especially when it concerns the courts.  The more impatient or 
 
134. Balkin, supra note 8, at 151. 
135. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Biden’s Court Commission Strikes the 
Right Balance, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/23/bidens-court-commission-
strikes-right-balance/. 
136. Balkin, supra note 8, at 151. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.  
139. Id. at 152. 
140. Id. at 30–37. 
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militant wings of the left, those advocating for immediate and dramatic 
escalation proportional to the Garland and Ginsburg episodes, are likely to see 
this as another concession from Democrats to a long-gone aspiration of 
civility that the Republicans have decisively abandoned in the name of 
constitutional hardball.  If, as Balkin and political scientists contend, we are 
seeing the results of asymmetric polarization141 – that is, the Republicans have 
moved farther to the right than the Democrats have to the left – then we might 
understand this set of court reform recommendations as an illustration of 
asymmetric constitutional hardball.   
Faced with a conservative constitutional regime that was given a last-
minute artificial life-extension just days before an election that handed the 
presidency to the Democrats by over five million votes, those on the left are 
likely to become impatient waiting for the judiciary – by natural process of 
replacement – to catch up to the American people.  A more symmetrical 
response from the Biden administration might be one that satisfies the calls 
from the left for a more proportional response to the Republican Party’s 
escalating constitutional warfare (#PackTheCourt) but that would still put us 
on the path towards deescalation and the regularizing of Supreme Court 
appointments.  Introducing four or six new, term-limited seats on the Supreme 
Court could achieve the long-term goals outlined by Balkin in The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time while in the short term providing restitution or restorative 
justice for those on the left who believe the Republicans effectively stole two 
seats from them.142  Given that the political opportunity structure may not 
allow for any serious court reform bills to be passed until after the next 
midterm elections, the Democrats have some time on their hands.143  
 
141. Id. at 162. See generally MATT GROSSMAN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, 
ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST 
DEMOCRATS (2016).  
142. The details of such a proposal could be fleshed out by the Courts 
Commission. But, in brief, these four or six new seats would need to be staggered in 
their terms – two at 18 year terms, two at 12 year terms, two at 8 year terms for 
example – so they would not all replaced at once by a single future president. When 
the non-term limited Justices retired, their seat would then become term-limited and 
be eligible for a single agreed-upon term (18 or 12 years seem to be the most popular 
proposals). As the new justices rotated off at varying points, their seats would also 
revert to the single agreed-upon term. Eventually, we would have 13 or 15 term-
limited seats and achieve regularized judicial appointments, which Balkin 
recommends as a longer term solution to polarization and escalating partisan warfare 
over judicial appointments.  
143. At the time of this writing it appears as if even if the Democrats win both 
of the run-off races for Senate in Georgia, they would at best have a 50-50 split in the 
Senate. Even with vice-president elect Kamala Harris as the tie-breaker, conservative 
Democrat Joe Manchin of West Virginia has signaled that he has no interest in 
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In the meantime, a six-Justice super-majority on the Supreme Court will, 
depending on how far they want to push their conservative counterrevolution, 
determine how urgent and how central the issue of court reform remains for 
the Democrats leading into the 2022 midterm elections.144  These six 
Republican-appointed Justices will determine through the scope and direction 
of their rulings whether Brutus and his dire warnings of the dangers of judicial 
independence are exhumed once again and weaponized in service of radical 
court restructuring and change, or whether Brutus is left interred, lying 
dormant until the next cycle of constitutional rot.  
 
 
eliminating the filibuster; a move that would be required for any court reform 
proposals to make it through that branch and land on President Biden’s desk.  
144. About the Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2021), for 
who appointed each of the current members of the Supreme Court. 
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/9
